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STOCHASTIC APPORTIONMENT
Geoffrey Grimmett
Abstract. The problem of how to allocate to states the seats in the US House of
Representatives is the most studied instance of what is termed the ‘apportionment
problem’. We propose a new method of apportionment which is stochastic, which
meets the quota condition, and which is fair in the sense of expectations. Two sources
of systematic unfairness are identified, firstly the lower bound condition (every state
shall receive at least one seat), and secondly the lower quota condition (every state
shall receive at least the integer part of its quota).
1. The problem of apportionment
Ten goats are to be assigned between three brothers in numbers proportional to the
ages (in years) of the recipients. Given the integral nature of a goat, it is not gen-
erally possible to meet exactly the condition of proportionality, and the resulting
‘apportionment problem’ is a classic of operational research. The associated liter-
ature is extensive, and includes on the one hand discussions of criteria to be used
in assessing different schemes, and on the other hand accounts of the properties of
specific classes of scheme. A point of especial focus has been the apportionment
of the seats in the House of Representatives between the states of the USA. There
are currently 50 states (excluding the District of Columbia) and 435 seats, which
are to be divided between the states according to the US Constitution [Article I,
Section 2] of 1787 thus:
“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several
States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . .”
No scheme is proposed in the Constitution, and the Article therein permits a spec-
trum of interpretation of the phrase ‘according to their respective numbers’. Politi-
cians, lawyers, mathematicians and others have been involved since in the cyclical
debate of how to apportion the seats.
Although there is little in this note which is specific to the US Congress, we
shall, for ease of exposition, use the terminology of the last problem. Our targets
here are to survey the general area, and to propose a new method of apportionment
which, in a certain way to be made more precise, meets all the usual criteria for
such schemes. This new method is a lottery scheme whose implementation uses
(pseudo-)random numbers. The scheme is fair so long as no minimal number of
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seats is allocated to all states however small. In the Congressional example, the
Constitution contains an additional condition that every state shall receive at least
one seat. It is this violation of the principle of proportional representation which
renders futile all attempts to obtain a truly fair system in which individuals are
equally represented.
We shall in Section 3 describe a new method which meets the so-called quota
condition (see Section 2) and gives proportional representation. In Section 4 we
present an adaptation of this method for use in situations in which there are lower
bounds on the allocations sought. We shall see in Section 4 that, in the presence
of a lower bound, the quota condition (see Section 2) provides another source of
unfairness.
The established theory of deterministic apportionment is summarised in Section
5. Those interested in learning more of the history and practice of apportionment
should consult the excellent book [1] of Balinski and Young.
2. Quota
We suppose there are s states with respective populations pi1, pi2, . . . , pis, and that
there are r seats in the House of Representatives. The total population size is
Π = pi1+pi2+· · ·+pis, and thus the exact quota of seats for state i is qi = rpii/Π. The
problem is that qi are not generally integers, whereas representatives are (by axiom)
indivisible. We call pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pis) and q = (q1, q2, . . . , qs) the population
vector and quota vector , respectively. We refer to the pair (pi, r) as a problem.
An allocation is a vector α = (α1, α2, . . . , αs) of non-negative integers with sum
r. An allocation α is said to ‘satisfy quota’ if αi ∈ {⌊qi⌋, ⌈qi⌉} for all i. An
allocation is said to ‘violate quota’ if it does not satisfy quota. Here, ⌊x⌋ denotes
the greatest integer not exceeding x, and ⌈x⌉ denotes the least integer not less than
x. We speak of ⌊qi⌋ (respectively, ⌈qi⌉) as the lower (respectively, upper) quota for
state i.
It seems generally (if not universally) accepted that the property of satisfying
quota is desirable. It is clear that, for all problems of the above type, there exists
necessarily at least one allocation which satisfies quota. This can cease to be the
case when further conditions are added. In a variety of situations including that
of the US Congress, there is a requirement that the αi be not too small. Let l =
(l1, l2, . . . , ls) be a given vector of non-negative integers. We say that an allocation
α ‘has lower bound’ l if αi ≥ li for all i. Of special interest is the case l = 1, the
vector of ones, not least since the relevant article of the US Constitution requires
that
“each State shall have at Least one Representative . . . ”
Such a requirement is potentially disturbing since there exist problems (pi, r) for
which no allocation exists satisfying quota and with lower bound 1. For a simple
(if extreme) example, consider the case when pi = (1, 1, 7) and r = 3.
It is a simple matter to see that there exists an allocation which satisfies quota
and with lower bound l if and only if
li ≤ ⌈qi⌉ for all i, and
∑
i
max{li, ⌊qi⌋} ≤ r.
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The satisfying of quota seems to be regarded as paramount amongst properties
of allocations . As noted above, we shall see in Section 4 that, in the presence of a
lower bound, the requirement of quota can be a further source of unfairness. There
are certain desirable properties of schemes for finding allocations, most prominently
that the scheme avoids each of the three ‘paradoxes’ — Alabama, population, and
new-state — to which we shall return in Section 5.
A word for the novice — in common with other similar problems, one may
be tempted to identify many desirable properties of schemes, only to find that
no scheme has them all. A well known example of this phenomenon is ‘Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem’, which states that no preference ranking exists for a society
which embraces a certain collection of five reasonable axioms (see [4, Chapter 14]).
3. Stochastic apportionment without lower bounds
Although lottery schemes have been mentioned briefly in the literature (see, for
example, [1]), the established theory is concentrated on deterministic schemes. Our
purpose here is to propose a family of stochastic schemes, one in particular, which
satisfy quota and which have the advantage of being truly fair and proportional in
that each state receives a (possibly random) number of seats having mean value
equal to the quota of the state. We will see in Section 4 that this cannot generally
be achieved in the presence of lower bounds on allocations, and therefore we make
the facilitating assumption for the duration of this section that no lower bound is
required .
A random allocation is a vector A = (A1, A2, . . . , As) of non-negative-integer-
valued random variables with sum r. A randomized scheme is a mapping which,
to each problem (pi, r), allocates a probability distribution on the space of appro-
priate allocations. Otherwise expressed, a randomized scheme results in a random
allocation (we shall not spend any time on the choice of probability space, and such
like).
There is a subtlety to the notion of a randomized scheme which we discuss briefly.
We may seek to apply such a scheme to two given problems, perhaps by applying it
twice to the same problem (pi, r), or perhaps by applying it to (pi, r) and to another
problem (pi′, r′) obtained from (pi, r) by changing some of the parameters. In so
doing, we encounter the question of ‘coupling’. That is, since randomized schemes
make use of pseudo-random numbers, we shall need to specify whether, at the
one extreme, we re-use for the second problem the pseudo-random numbers used
already for the first, or, at the other extreme, we make use of ‘new’ pseudo-random
numbers. We discuss this no further at this stage (see, however, the two final
paragraphs of this section), since the discussion will concentrate for the moment on
the use of randomized schemes for a single problem only.
We say that a random allocation A ‘satisfies quota almost surely’ if
P(A satisfies quota) = 1.
Here, P denotes probability, and (later) E denotes expectation. A randomized
scheme is said to satisfy quota if the ensuing random allocation satisfies quota
almost surely.
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In advance of making a concrete proposal for a randomized scheme, we point
out that there exist in general a multiplicity of such schemes which satisfy quota.
Let q′i = qi − ⌊qi⌋, let s
′ = |{i : q′i > 0}|, and let r
′ = r −
∑
i⌊qi⌋. We call
q′ = (q′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ s) the fractional-quota vector . Since state i receives ⌊qi⌋ seats
of right, we are required only to allocate the remaining r′ seats amongst the s′
‘unsatisfied’ states. This may be done in
(
s′
r′
)
ways, to each of which we must assign
a probability. If we require in addition that the scheme be fair in the sense that
the ensuing allocation A satisfies E(Ai) = qi for all i, then we obtain thus a set of
s′ constraints. Thus the space of such randomized schemes may have up to
(
s′
r′
)
−s′
degrees of freedom. In the special cases r′ = 1, r′ = s′ − 1, there is a unique
randomized scheme which is fair and satisfies quota.
We turn now to our concrete proposal. There are three steps.
I. We permute at random the labels of the states.
This is proposed since the scheme which follows depends on the labelling of the
states (that is, on the indices of the pii), and it seems desirable to reduce to a
minimum any correlations which depend on this extraneous element. In the Con-
gressional example, it would arguably not be right for the allocation to Alabama
to depend systematically to a greater degree on that to Alaska than that to Maine.
For ease of presentation, we shall in the following not change the notation pii, but
shall assume that pi is the population vector after permuting at random.
II. We provisionally allocate ⌊qi⌋ seats to state i.
This is prompted by the minimal quota for each state, and leaves so far unallocated
a certain number r′ = r −
∑
i⌊qi⌋ of seats. Let q
′
i = qi − ⌊qi⌋, as before.
III. Let U be a random variable with the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and let
Qi = U +
∑i
j=1 q
′
i. Let A
′
i be the indicator function of the event that the
interval [Qi−1, Qi) contains an integer. We allocate a further A
′
i seats to state
i.
State i receives a total of ⌊qi⌋+A
′
i = Ai seats. The total number of seats allocated
at step III equals the length of the interval [Q0, Qs), which equals
∑
i{qi−⌊qi⌋} = r
′,
whence A is an allocation (that is, it has sum r). It is evident that ⌊qi⌋ ≤ Ai ≤ ⌈qi⌉,
whence A satisfies quota. In addition, eachQj , when reduced modulo 1, is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, E(A′i) equals the length of the interval
[Qi−1, Qi), which is to say that E(A
′
i) = Qi−Qi−1 = q
′
i and hence E(Ai) = qi. We
summarise this by saying that the scheme satisfies quota, and is fair in the sense
that the mean number of seats per head of population is constant between states.
We offer no justification for this scheme apart from fairness and ease of imple-
mentation. We caution against adopting any randomized scheme without a proof
of fairness, and as an example we summarise one arguably reasonable but definitely
unfair scheme for allocating the remaining r′ seats.
Conditional sampling. We select independent indices It, 1 ≤ t ≤ r
′, each It
having distribution P(It = i) = q
′
i/
∑
i q
′
i, and we consider a random vector J =
(J1, J2, . . . , Jr′) having the probability distribution of I1, I2, . . . , Ir′ conditional on
Iu 6= Iv for all u 6= v. We allocate one extra seat to those states having indices
J1, J2, . . . , Jr′ . It is the case that
E|{t : It = i}| = q
′
i for all i,
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but the same statement is generally false with I replaced by J . This is easily seen
when r′ and s′ are large. The conditioning amounts to a large deviation, and the
distribution of J may be close to an appropriately tilted distribution (see [3, Section
5.11]).
We close this section with some remarks on the use of pseudo-random numbers.
It will be argued that the fairness of a stochastic scheme may not be evident to
the population. It seems that politicians may be less willing than the people to
accept such a scheme, since politicians are very sensitive to the marginal value to
a party of a single seat. Lotteries are already in wide use in areas having impact
on individuals, not least in state-accredited systems for raising money for so-called
‘good causes’. As a further example, the allocation of individuals to the control
group of a medical trial is usually done by lottery, and such a decision may be a
matter of life or death. See [5] for an extended discussion of the drawing of lots.
When applying a randomized scheme to two or more problems, one needs to
decide whether or not to re-sample the required pseudo-random numbers. The
expectations under study remain the same, but the external perception of fairness
is likely to be greater if the roulette wheel is spun afresh. A statistical virtue of
re-sampling is the reduction of variances.
4. Stochastic apportionment with lower bounds
We consider in this section the problem of finding an allocation which satisfies quota
and is subject to a lower bound l. Let l = (l1, l2, . . . , ls) be a vector of non-negative
integers satisfying li ≤ ⌈qi⌉ for all i. We assume in addition that
∑
i li ≤ r, since
otherwise there exists no allocation with lower bound l and sum r. We call a state
small if qi < li, and we note that the lower-bound condition is tantamount to
favouring the small states. It follows that, whenever there exist small states, then
the other states are at a disadvantage, and there can exist no scheme which is fair.
But how fair a randomized scheme can be achieved?
Let I− = {i : qi < li} be the set of small states, and also I= = {i : qi = li}
and I+ = {i : qi > li}. We assume that there exists at least one small state, in
that I− 6= ∅, since otherwise there is no new problem. Since
∑
i li ≤ r, it must
be the case that I+ 6= ∅. For i ∈ I− ∪ I=, we allocate to state i exactly li seats,
and we write µ = r −
∑
i∈I−∪I=
li for the number of remaining seats. Note that∑
i∈I+
qi > µ, whence no fair allocation can exist.
In allocating seats to states in I+, we seek a guiding principle, and we propose
the principle of equality of representation amongst states in I+.
The scheme of Section 3 (particularly step III thereof) is based on the quota
vector q and the fractional-quota vector q′. Since the allocations to states in I−∪I=
have already been determined, we are directed by the above principle to seek a new
quota vector Q = (Qi : i ∈ I+) such that:
(a)
∑
i∈I+
Qi = µ,
(b) the mean number of representatives per head of population is constant be-
tween states in I+, which is to say that there exists a constant γ such that
Qi
qi
= γ for all i ∈ I+, (4.1)
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(c) ⌊qi⌋ ≤ Qi ≤ ⌈qi⌉ for all i ∈ I+.
Following consideration of the lower bound condition, we shall require also that
(d) Qi ≥ li for all i ∈ I+.
Note that (c) implies (d) since, by (c),
Qi ≥ ⌊qi⌋ ≥ li for i ∈ I+.
We next investigate conditions under which (a), (b), (c) may be achieved simul-
taneously. Assume that (a) and (b) hold. We sum (4.1) over i ∈ I+ to obtain by
(a) that
γ =
∑
i∈I+
Qi∑
i∈I+
qi
=
µ∑
i∈I+
qi
. (4.2)
It follows that (c) is satisfied if and only if
Qi = γqi ≥ ⌊qi⌋ for all i ∈ I+. (4.3)
If (c) holds, which is equivalent to ⌊Qi⌋ = ⌊qi⌋ for i ∈ I+, then we proceed by
applying the algorithm of the last section thus. For i ∈ I+, we allocate ⌊qi⌋ seats to
state i. Then we apply step III to the new fractional-quota vector Q′ = (Qi−⌊Qi⌋ :
i ∈ I+) with (by (a)) µ −
∑
i∈I+
⌊qi⌋ seats. The outcome is a random allocation
which satisfies quota and which is fair when restricted to the states in I+.
Suppose that (c) does not hold, in that there exists i ∈ I+ such that Qi < ⌊qi⌋.
One strategy would be to apply the scheme of the last section to the quota vector Q,
obtaining thereby a random allocation A satisfying E(Ai) = Qi for each i ∈ I+. If
this random allocation does not satisfy quota, then the scheme has failed. There is
however a certain probability that quota is satisfied. By counting the mean number
of states whose allocation does not satisfy the respective quota, we find that
P(A does not satisfy quota) ≤
∑
i∈I+
max{1, ⌊qi⌋ −Qi}1{Qi<⌊qi⌋}, (4.4)
where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A. Equality holds in (4.4) if
there exists at most one state i with Qi < ⌊qi⌋.
Let us suppose that (c) does not hold but that the outcome A satisfies quota.
A slightly subtle point is that, conditional on this event, A is not fair. This is
so because the conditioning changes the expectations. In summary, the scheme —
work with the quota vector Q repeatedly until one obtains a random allocation which
satisfies quota — is not a fair scheme.
A feasible line of enquiry which we have not pursued is to postulate probabilistic
models for problems, and to calculate the probability for such a model that the
above scheme results in an allocation which does not satisfy quota. In certain
circumstances, the ‘law of anomalous numbers’ (see [2, 3]) could be used as a basis
for such a model.
If the satisfying of quota is paramount, then one must accept a further degree of
unfairness, and we propose the following. If Qi < ⌊qi⌋, we allocate to state i exactly
c© Geoffrey Grimmett, 1 July 2002
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⌊qi⌋ seats. Writing J+ = {i ∈ I+ : Qi ≥ ⌊qi⌋}, we now iterate the above process
restricted to the states in J+. That is, we seek, as above, numbers Ri, i ∈ J+, such
that:
(a′)
∑
i∈J+
Ri = µ−
∑
i∈I+\J+
⌊qi⌋,
(b′) the mean number of representatives per head of population is constant be-
tween states in J+, in that there exists a constant γ
′ such that
Ri
qi
= γ′ for all i ∈ J+,
(c′) ⌊qi⌋ ≤ Ri ≤ ⌈qi⌉ for all i ∈ J+.
We find this time from (a′) and (b′) that Ri = γ
′qi where
γ′ =
µ−
∑
i∈I+\J+
⌊qi⌋∑
i∈J+
qi
.
If Ri ≥ ⌊qi⌋ for all i ∈ J+, we apply the scheme to the new quota vector R = (Ri :
i ∈ J+). Otherwise, we note that any state i with Ri < ⌊qi⌋ must be handled in a
way which will disfavour those remaining, namely by allocating to it ⌊qi⌋ seats.
This scheme, when iterated to reach a conclusion, identifies different levels of un-
fairness in its consecutive applications of the principle of equality of representation
amongst the remaining states . Note that it terminates with a random allocation
which satisfies quota if and only if there exists an allocation which satisfies both
quota and the lower bound.
We emphasize that, in the presence of a lower bound, the principle of satisfy-
ing quota is another potential source of unfairness. The upper quota presents no
problem, but the lower quota can indeed be problematic.
Let us apply the above argument in the Congressional example, with l = 1. In
the following table are listed those states i which, in the nine ten-yearly appor-
tionments of 1920–2000, have Qi < ⌊qi⌋, these being the apportionments with the
current House size of 435. In just four of these apportionments, namely those of
1920/1950/1970/2000, do there exist states i with Qi < ⌊qi⌋, and in each such case
there is only a small probability that the proposed scheme results in an alloca-
tion based on Q which does not satisfy quota. For example, in 1950, the ensuing
allocation could only fail to satisfy quota if New York were allocated 42 seats
rather than 43, an event of probability ⌊qi⌋ − Qi = 43 − 42.962 = 0.038, where
i is the index of New York. The corresponding probability for the year 2000 is
⌊qj⌋ −Qj = 19 − 18.999 = 0.001, where j is the index of Pennsylvania. A similar
calculation is valid for the other years, and in each case the resulting probability is
small. Based on this empirical evidence, we claim that the proposed scheme, based
on Q, is likely to result in an apportionment of the House of Representatives which
satisfies quota.
c© Geoffrey Grimmett, 1 July 2002
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Year # small states states with Qi < ⌊qi⌋ original quota qi new quota Qi
1920 3 Pennsylvania 36.053 35.973
Florida 4.004 3.995
1930 3 none
1940 3 none
1950 3 New York 43.038 42.962
1960 4 none
1970 3 Virginia 10.000 9.984
1980 3 none
1990 3 none
2000 4 Pennsylvania 19.013 18.999
Table 1. For the apportionments of 1920–2000, this is a list of states i
for which Qi < ⌊qi⌋. The entries are derived from data to be found in
[1].
However, in these years 1920/1950/1970/2000, such an outome would be slightly
unfair to the other states. Suppose, instead, we acknowledge this unfairness explic-
itly by automatically allocating to any state i with Qi < ⌊qi⌋ the number ⌊qi⌋ seats.
In each case, when we calculate the amended quota vector R = (Ri : i ∈ J+), we
find that every Ri satisfies Ri ≥ ⌊qi⌋. The outcome of the composite scheme is
therefore an allocation which favours firstly the small states, and secondly any
state i with Qi < ⌊qi⌋, and then proceeds to allocate seats to the remaining states
in a way which gives equality of representation between them.
Finally we note the existence of an alternative method which might in principle
be followed. This is easier to apply but violates the condition of fairness, and is as
follows. One reduces the original fractional-quota vector (q′i : i ∈ I+), by a constant
factor, that is, one works with a new fractional-quota vector (q′′i : i ∈ I+) given by
q′′i = δq
′
i satisfying ∑
i∈I+
{⌊qi⌋+ q
′′
i } = µ.
5. Deterministic apportionment
It is conventional to apportion the House of Representatives using an algorithm
which is deterministic rather than stochastic. The book [1] is an excellent account
of theory and practice for mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike, and the
reader is referred to it for a full account. No attempt is made here to do more than
to summarise the situation.
Let us assume that there is no lower bound. The discussion in the literature
has concentrated largely on a category of schemes termed ‘divisor methods’. Let
δ : {0, 1, 2, . . .} → R be a given function satisfying b ≤ δ(b) ≤ b + 1 for all b. Let
λ be a parameter taking positive values, to be thought of as the notional number
of head of population to be represented by each representative. The population pii
of state i is divided by λ to obtain the λ-quota pii/λ of seats for that state. At the
c© Geoffrey Grimmett, 1 July 2002
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first stage, we find the λ-allocation to state i, defined as
αi(λ) =
{
⌊pii/λ⌋ if pii/λ ≤ δ(⌊pii/λ⌋),
⌊pii/λ⌋+ 1 if pii/λ > δ(⌊pii/λ⌋).
When equality holds in that pii/λ = δ(⌊pii/λ⌋), we have set αi(λ) = ⌊pii/λ⌋ for the
sake of definitiveness, but it is important only that some definite rule be followed.
The resulting λ-allocation α(λ) = (αi(λ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ s) does not generally sum
to the house size r. At the second stage, we ‘tune’ λ until we find λ such that∑
i αi(λ) = r, and we output the allocation α(λ).
There is an infinity of possible choices for the function δ, of which the following
instances have been studied.
Name Originator The function δ(b)
Smallest divisors Adams (1832) b
Harmonic means Dean (1832) 2/{b−1 + (b+ 1)−1}
Equal proportions Hill (1911)
√
b(b+ 1)
Major fractions Webster (1832) b+ 1
2
Greatest divisors Jefferson (1792) b+ 1
Table 2. The five principal divisor methods ordered by increasing δ.
A sixth scheme, termed the method of Hamilton (1792) or the ‘method of largest
remainders’, is as follows. A state with quota qi receives by right ⌊qi⌋ seats. The
remaining r −
∑
i⌊qi⌋ seats are allocated to those r −
∑
i⌊qi⌋ states j with largest
remainders qj − ⌊qj⌋.
One seeks principles which enable distinctions to be drawn between these six
schemes. In common with other instances in operational research, one can be over-
principled. Every method has its drawbacks, and to seek the perfect system can be
to eliminate all possibilities. A detailed and informative discussion is to be found
in [1], from which a few points are extracted here.
A scheme is called population monotone if: for all i 6= j, when individuals move
from state i to state j, then i should not get more seats and j fewer. We have
from [1, Thm 6.1] that no scheme exists which is both population monotone and
necessarily satisfies quota. Furthermore, (see [1, Prop. 6.4]), Jefferson’s ‘greatest
divisor’ method is the only population monotone method which stays above lower
quota (in that the ensuing allocation α necessarily satisfies αi ≥ ⌊qi⌋ for all i), and
Adams’ ‘smallest divisor’ method is the only population monotone scheme which
stays below upper quota (in that αi ≤ ⌈qi⌉ for all i).
A point of focus is the degree to which a scheme favours large over small states,
There are various ways of measuring such bias, both theoretical and empirical, and
the case is made in [1, 6] that Webster’s ‘major fraction’ method is the least biased
in this regard.
A scheme is said to be ‘house monotone’ if no state’s allocation diminishes when
the size r of the house increases. A scheme which is not house monotone is said
to suffer from the ‘Alabama paradox’. It is considered desirable that a scheme
be house monotone. Other desirable features of schemes include the absence of
c© Geoffrey Grimmett, 1 July 2002
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what are known as the ‘population paradox’ (in a growing population, state i can
grow faster than state j, and yet lose a seat to j), and the ‘new-states paradox’ (a
new state may join the union, with an appropriate number of new seats, but the
allocations between the original states change).
One may ask in what sense does the stochastic apportionment scheme of Section 3
meet these requirements. The latter scheme is population monotone in a stochastic
sense, which is to say that, when state i loses people to state j, the number of
seats allocated to i (respectively, j) is stochastically non-increasing (respectively,
non-decreasing). (See [3, Section 4.12] for a definition of stochastic ordering.) In a
similar stochastic sense, the scheme is house monotone.
Finally we consider the case of deterministic schemes in situations where there is
a non-trivial lower bound on the allocation sought. As said already, there may exist
no allocation which satisfies quota and the lower bound, and even if there exists such
an allocation, there will generally exist no scheme which is fair across the board. The
method used currently for apportioning the House of Representatives is to allocate
one seat to each state however small (in 2000 there were just four states whose
quotas were smaller than one) and then to apply the method of equal proportions
to those states whose ‘residual’ quotas are strictly positive. The outcomes of this
scheme have, fortunately in recent decades, been allocations which have satisfied
quota. See [1, Appendix B] for further information.
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